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Symposium on War Duration

Challenges to the Study of Long Wars
Zachary C. Shirkey, Hunter College, City University of New York
Rationalist, psychological, and domestic politics approaches have all generated internally
consistent, plausible explanations for long wars. But sorting out which of these explanations is most valid is quite difﬁcult, because deﬁnitional questions bedevil the study of
war duration, and more importantly, because it is very hard to evaluate the evidence
for competing explanations of war duration. The latter difﬁculty arises for three reasons.
First, many state behaviors are consistent with multiple, competing explanations of long
wars. Second, in most states, multiple people play important roles in crafting foreign policies, meaning different leaders may have different primary motives for continuing a war.
Last, even individual leaders may be driven by multiple motives. These challenges are relevant for both case study research and large-N studies. Recognizing these challenges should
help to improve future studies of the causes of long wars.
Keywords: war duration, research design, multi-causality, domestic politics, psychology,
rationality

W

hy do states continue to wage wars after it is apparent that a victory cannot
be obtained quickly and that the ﬁghting will go on for years rather than
months? This is an important and difﬁcult question. It is important because long
wars are particularly destructive. They produce more fatalities1 and are a greater
threat to regimes’ stability than are shorter wars.2 The difﬁculty of studying long
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1. H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World
War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 65; Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 50 (2006): 276–89; Zachary C. Shirkey, “When
and How Many: The Effects of Third Party Joining on Casualties and Duration in Interstate Wars,”
Journal of Peace Research 49 (2012): 321–34, at 331; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to
Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982); Alex Weisiger,
Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conﬂicts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2013), 7–8, 59–60.
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226 | Challenges to the Study of Long Wars
wars is not that it is challenging to think about reasons why states would continue
to ﬁght. Indeed, rationalist, psychological, and domestic politics approaches have
all generated logical and plausible explanations for the duration of long wars. Rather,
the problem stems in part from the fact that deﬁnitional questions and uncertainty
about how broadly ﬁndings can be applied bedevil the study of war duration. Furthermore, even though many explanations for long wars can be generated, it is very
hard to determine which competing explanation is most compelling—both for wars
in general and for speciﬁc wars. Each of these problems will be explored in turn.

What are Long Wars and How Widely Can Theories
of War Duration be Applied?
As with many questions in social science, deﬁnitional and applicability problems
plague the study of long wars. In the ﬁrst place, there is no agreed-upon deﬁnition
of what a long war is. While certainly a war that lasts many years, such as the IranIraq War (1980–1988), is a long war and a war that lasts less than a month, such as
the Six Days War (1967), is not a long war, the deﬁnitional cutoff between these two
concepts is unclear. In particular, are wars that last longer than one year, but less
than two years, long wars? The answer is not obvious.
This makes it tempting to deﬁne long wars using some variable other than time.
For instance, perhaps long wars are best thought of as wars in which a chance at
peace was missed. Even presuming that it would be possible to determine what
should be considered to be a genuine missed opportunity, some explanations of long
wars, such as those based on commitment problems, argue that often no such earlier
chance at peace would have been available.3 In other words, wars can endure even
without leaders missing opportunities for settlement. Thus, we are stuck with using
duration to deﬁne long wars and must accept a somewhat arbitrary cutoff between
long and short wars. For the purposes of this article, wars lasting longer than 18 months
will be considered long wars.
More problematic than length alone are questions of what counts as a single war.
For instance, is a set of linked conﬂicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815),
one war or a series of wars? Provided that the halts in the ﬁghting are more than
failed cease-ﬁres, it is presumably best to see such conﬂicts as many wars, especially
when the individual conﬂicts are terminated by formal peace treaties.4 Indeed, there
3. James D. Fearon, “Fighting Rather than Bargaining,” Unpublished manuscript, 2013, 2–4
(Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University); Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
4. Unfortunately, the decline in formal declarations of war and concomitant decline in formal peace treaties makes such a task more difﬁcult. See Christopher Greenwood, “The Concept
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are whole research agendas, such as, but not limited to, the literature on enduring
rivalries, that study such linked conﬂicts.5 Thornier still are instances, such as in
the First Balkan War (1912–13), where some belligerent states leave the still-raging
conﬂict and then return at a later date. If we approach wars in a dyadic manner,
should such temporary exits be seen as war termination? Usually they are not, but
a case could be made that they should be seen that way.6
In addition, ﬁndings on war duration may not be applicable over the whole universe of interstate wars. This is because the nature of war may vary across time periods and also according to states’ level of development7 and regime type.8 These
factors should affect the size and ability of the forces employed, the resolve and resiliency of the states engaged, and the issues at stake. For instance, European wars in
the seventeenth and twentieth centuries were more likely to become total wars compared to European wars in the mid-eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, which
were far more limited in nature. Similarly, the size of military forces deployed in European wars have expanded and contracted over the centuries, in response to shifts
in the relationship between the state and the governed and in response to changes
in military technology. Explanations of war duration need to be able to address the
causal role of these variations in intensity, aims, and scale, or else to state the scope
of the applicability of their ﬁndings. Reiter’s call in this symposium to think about
the connections between war initiation and duration should help with this problem,
especially in relation to the aims of the belligerent states.9
In truth, it is possible to make too much of such semantic problems and questions of scope. Many areas in political science face similar issues. Terrorism, for instance, is notoriously difﬁcult to deﬁne,10 and all social science theories are limited in
the scope of their applicability. Yet, as long as researchers are aware of these potential

of War in Modern International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 36 (1987):
283–306.
5. Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Scott Wolford, “The Problem of Shared Victory: War-Winning
Coalitions and Postwar Peace,” Journal of Politics 79 (2017): 702–16.
6. For instance, see Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
7. Douglas Lemke, “War and Development,” International Studies Review 5 (2003): 55–63,
at 57–58.
8. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, “War and the Fate of Regimes,” 648 (see note 2
above).
9. Dan Reiter, “Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars,” Polity 50 (2018):
168–77.
10. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism: The Deﬁnitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 36 (2004): 375–419.
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228 | Challenges to the Study of Long Wars
problems, address them, and make clear what sort of choices they have made, productive research should be possible.

Competing Explanations for Long Wars
A second problem for the study of war duration is that it is difﬁcult to determine
which explanations of long wars are most compelling, for three reasons. First, many
state behaviors are consistent with the expectations and mechanisms of multiple,
competing explanations of long wars. In other words, evidence that is consistent
with a given theory can fail to conﬁrm that explanation because the evidence is often
also consistent with rival explanations.
Second, as domestic politics explanations of war dynamics in general correctly argue, multiple people play important roles in crafting states’ foreign policies. Though
these leaders may all support continuing a war, they may do so for different reasons,
implying that multiple explanations could be in play. It also means that it is necessary to determine which members of the leadership group are actually important in
deciding to continue the war and which of their arguments persuaded other wavering, but critical, members of that group.
Third, individuals may have multiple motives for supporting continued ﬁghting. They may see little reason to clarify which reasons are most important and
instead argue that all of their reasons, when combined, make a compelling case for
continued ﬁghting. Further, determining whether their reasons are genuine or are instead rationalizations that are mobilized to buttress the individual’s actual reasons
may be difﬁcult to untangle—not just for the scholar but perhaps even for the individual.11 This, in turn, can make it difﬁcult for scholars to sort out the relative merits
of various explanations of why a war lasted as long as it did beyond saying it was multicausal. Before discussing each of these difﬁculties in detail, the current state of the
war duration literature will be brieﬂy summarized.
Most explanations of long wars fall into one of the following camps: rationalist,
domestic politics, and psychological. Rationalist explanations that also adopt the
simplifying assumption that states are unitary actors tend to ﬁnd that private information—which is one of the main rationalist causes of war—should be revealed
reasonably quickly by battles and offers for settlement. Thus, wars fought over private information should be short.12 This has led rationalists to focus on the inability

11. Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (2006): 641–63, at 644–45.
12. Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (2006):
169–203, at 170–73.
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of one or more of the belligerent parties to credibly commit to honoring a peace
agreement as the best explanation of long wars,13 although other rationalist causes
of long wars—such as the introduction of new private information14—or wars
characterized mostly by expected, attritional battles which reveal no private information15 are possible.
Wars fought due to commitment problems tend to be long because states pursue extreme war aims in order to eliminate the commitment problems. Such aims
could include state death, regime change, the destruction of much of the good that
is at stake, or a major degradation of the opposing state’s power.16 Such expansive
war aims arise because of the nature of commitment problems. Commitment problems occur when what is being fought over would signiﬁcantly shift the balance of
power between the various belligerent states or because one of the belligerent states
expects its opponent to become substantially stronger relative to it in the future.
Both of these problems mean that the state gaining power would be in a position
in the future to demand a more favorable settlement than it could obtain now. This
prevents the state from being able to commit in the long term to an agreement that
reﬂects the current distribution of power. Attempts to prevent such expected power
shifts require pursuing the sort of expansive war aims discussed above, which in
turn lead to long wars.
Domestic politics explanations of long wars usually focus on incentives and
constraints faced by individuals and leadership groups. Both individuals and leadership groups may opt to continue wars because they beneﬁt directly from the conﬂict, even though the war is not beneﬁting the state or society as a whole.17 For

13. Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 22–50;
Robert Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” American Journal of Political Science
56 (2012): 620–37, at 620–21; Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
14. Zachary C. Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Duration,” International Studies Review 18
(2016): 244–67, at 250–52.
15. Fearon, “Fighting Rather than Bargaining,” 9–10 (see note 3 above); Catherine Langlois
and Jean-Pierre Langlois, “Should Rational States Really Bargain While They Fight?,” unpublished manuscript, Georgetown University and San Francisco University, 2012.
16. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 755–71, at 766–67;
Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” 630–32 (see note 13 above); Reiter, How Wars
End, 21–35 (see note 13 above); Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts,
War Termination and the Korean War (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
17. Sarah Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment,” American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 457–77, at 460–62; Goemans,
War and Punishment, 36–51 (see note 1 above); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C.
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instance, leaders’ ability to remain in ofﬁce and even their physical safety may be
tied directly to the successful prosecution of the war. Similarly, leaders may proﬁt
ﬁnancially from the war. The key to such explanations is that the leadership group
has to be able to remain in power and continue the war, even though accepting a
peace offer would be optimal for the society at large. This in turn requires either
hiding setbacks from the broader population—something that should become increasingly difﬁcult over the course of a war—or suppressing popular discontent
with the war. Obviously, governments’ abilities to do this will vary by regime type,
the strength of governments’ repressive capacities, the scale of the setbacks faced
in the war, and how much cooperation is needed from society as a whole to wage
the war. To the extent that governments are able to do this, wars could continue
until the private beneﬁts come to an end, there is a change in leadership, or the state’s
military collapses.
Alternatively, the leadership group could want to end the war, but might depend on support from more hawkish constituencies in order to remain in power.
If the leadership group values its political survival more highly than its desire to
end the war, the war could continue until a turnover in leadership or military collapse occurred.18
Psychological approaches argue that although leaders’ decisions are generally
reasoned and purposeful, they can be inﬂuenced or impaired by elements of the
human psyche; see, for instance, Stanley’s and Dolan’s contributions to this symposium.19 Speciﬁcally, psychological approaches argue that factors such as cognitive biases, the impact of emotion on beliefs and decision making, a focus on sunk
costs, or concerns about national honor may prevent settlement, thereby extending
conﬂicts.20 These factors may alter how leaders update their beliefs, causing them to
resist accepting rational offers for settlement. While these impediments ultimately
Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 48 (2004): 937–
61, at 939–42; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see previous note).
18. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above); Michael P. Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005).
19. Elizabeth A. Stanley, “War Duration and the Micro-Dynamics of Decision Making under Stress,” Polity 50 (2018): 178–200. Thomas M. Dolan, “Moving Beyond Pathology: Why
Psychologists Should Care About Short Wars,” Polity 50 (2018): 201–14.
20. Thomas M. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime
Success,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 230–42; Thomas M. Dolan, “Demanding
the Impossible: Honor, Bargaining, and War,” Security Studies 24 (2015): 528–62; Dominic Johnson, Overconﬁdence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War,” Security Studies 24
(2015): 662–95; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
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can be overcome, they imply that wars may continue far longer than rational calculation would suggest.
Despite their different assumptions, these varying explanations of long wars often predict similar behaviors (see Weisiger in this symposium21). In particular, most
explanations of long wars predict a lack of updating by leaders and a tendency to
ignore or discount negative information. For rational, unitary actors, this may be
because leaders expect a long, difﬁcult ﬁght with setbacks, but believe such a war
is necessary because there are commitment problems that the war offers a fair prospect of overcoming.22 Such rational, unitary actors may also believe they will triumph in an attritional conﬂict due to a superior ability to bear costs; therefore, long
attritional conﬂicts would not be initially discouraging to them.23 Likewise, advocates of psychological explanations might expect leaders to dismiss negative events
out of a reluctance to admit their errors, a refusal to make tradeoffs, or observational
biases.24 Leaders focused on honor rather than tangible gains might also ignore setbacks when deciding whether or not to continue ﬁghting.25 Finally, domestic politics
explanations would suggest that leaders may ignore setbacks if acknowledging or
acting on them would lead to leadership change or if leaders are likely to gain personally from continued ﬁghting.26 All these explanations of long wars, both rationalchoice and psychological, would predict protracted ﬁghting with few, if any, exchanges of offers between sides. These explanations would also predict that even
within councils of state there would be little change in expectations or willingness
to lower demands in response to negative information from the battleﬁeld. Thus,
scholars with competing explanations of long wars might well point to the same evidence as being consistent with their preferred theories.
Even competing explanations arising from within domestic politics approaches
can produce similar predictions about what sort of events should be associated with

21. Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War
Duration,” Polity 50 (2018): 215–24.
22. Reiter, How Wars End, 25–34 (see note 13 above); Powell, “Persistent Fighting and
Shifting Power” (see note 13 above); Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
23. Langlois and Langlois, “Should Rational States Really Bargain While They Fight?” (see
note 15 above); Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Duration,” 252–54 (see note 14 above).
24. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home?” (see note 20 above); Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible”
(see note 20 above); Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
25. Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible” (see note 20 above); Lanoszka and Hunzeker,
“Rage of Honor” (see note 20 above).
26. Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma” (see note 17 above); Goemans, War and Punishment,
36–51 (see note 1 above); Mitchell and Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force” (see
note 17 above); Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
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war termination. For instance, Stanley and Sawyer argue that wars can become protracted because of three distinct reasons arising from domestic politics.27 First,
leaders may have large personal stakes (political, ﬁnancial, or related to their own
security) in a war, which leads them to favor continued ﬁghting. Second, leaders
may not know that they should end a war, due to information obstacles that can
arise from organizational or psychological sources. Third, leadership groups may
be unable to end a war even though they would prefer to do so because certain constituencies, whom they depend upon to remain in power, favor continued ﬁghting.
For wars in which any of these three incentives for leaders to prolong the conﬂict
exists, Stanley and Sawyer logically suggest that a change in the ruling coalition is
needed to bring about peace and that war termination, therefore, is often associated
with such changes in ruling coalitions. Since a leadership change would be consistent with any of the three explanations of how leaders’ personal incentives can prolong wars, a hypothetical large-N study that found a correlation between leadership
turnover and peace settlements would be unable to adjudicate between these proposed domestic sources of long wars, although it would support domestic explanations of war duration in general.28
These difﬁculties associated with sorting through evidence are not limited to
large-N studies. Although case studies can contextualize data, making it possible
to sift through the various causes, they have their own challenges. One obvious issue is that while they may be able to explain the causes of one long war, individual
cases in isolation can say little about overall trends. Most clearly, a negative ﬁnding
in a single case does little to rule out a probabilistic explanation of state behavior.29
Of course, multiple case studies can employ comparative methods and generate
reasons to believe both that the causal arguments are correct and that they operate
widely.30

27. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above); Elizabeth A. Stanley and John P. Sawyer,
“The Equiﬁnality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 53 (2009): 651–76.
28. Also, some leadership turnovers may be caused by the decision to seek peace, rather than
being a cause of the decision to end the war. For instance, the decision to appoint Prince Maximilian of Baden as German Chancellor in September 1918 was made after the decision to ask for an
armistice had been made, and it was made in order to shift the responsibility for peace onto the
German liberals; see David Stevenson, “1918 Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (2005):
107–39.
29. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 682–93, at 686.
30. James Rosenau, “Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy or Field?,” International Studies Quarterly 12 (1968): 296–329.
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However, even ﬁne-grained case studies of long wars can run into difﬁculties that
go beyond these issues that all case studies face. Speciﬁcally, much as with statistical
analyses, individual cases may contain behavior that is consistent with many competing explanations. For example, consider the debate over the causes of continued
ﬁghting in World War I after 1916, when the stalemate on the Western Front was
obvious to all. Well-supported, competing theories have claimed that the war continued for reasons of domestic politics, honor, commitment problems, or the introduction of new private information.31 Since these theories predict that leaders would
have made very different sorts of arguments in government deliberations, one would
expect case studies to be able to sort out which causes are most important in a given
long war. But the ongoing disagreement over why ﬁghting continued for as long as
it did in World War I suggests that some other difﬁculty must be at work.
One reason, which is made apparent by domestic politics approaches to war duration, is that decisions to continue ﬁghting are made by groups of individuals. Since
two or more states need to choose war in order for ﬁghting to continue, multiple
groups of many individuals are involved. There is no reason to expect various leaders to weight reasons of state, personal gain, or intangibles like honor equally. Indeed, members of a government might not even face the same incentive structures.
Some may beneﬁt more from the direct exploitation of natural resources during
conﬂicts, while others may be in more danger of being removed from ofﬁce or otherwise harmed after the war. Also, individuals may advance an argument not because it is the one they ﬁnd most compelling, but because they believe that the argument is the one most likely to persuade others. This means that different arguments
may be raised at different times, and it may not always be clear which ones matter
most. Therefore, while it is possible to observe which factions win debates about
war and peace, it is not always possible to determine which motives are most compelling in leading a particular faction to favor the course that it does or which arguments are most important in persuading skeptics to ultimately back the war.
For example, after the initial U.S. victories in northern Mexico during the MexicanAmerican War (1846–48), members of the Mexican government emphasized very
different reasons for continuing the war. President López de Santa Anna reasonably
believed he could remain in power only if he delivered military victory. He also believed at ﬁrst that he could defeat isolated U.S. forces in northern Mexico and later
that the rough terrain between Veracruz and Mexico City would allow for a successful
31. Goemans, War and Punishment, 36–51 (see note 1 above); Lanoszka and Hunzeker, “Rage
of Honor” (see note 20 above); Reiter, How Wars End, 21–50 (see note 13 above); Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Duration,” 250–52 (see note 14 above).
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Mexican defense. Others argued that the long American supply line from Veracruz
was vulnerable and that attacks on it would force American forces to withdraw. Still
others focused more narrowly on the domestic consequences of continuing the war.
Gomez Farias, the Mexican vice president, favored continued ﬁghting since it would
create an excuse to tax the Catholic Church, while some Liberals hoped that it would
lead to a catastrophic Mexican defeat, enabling them to overthrow the entire Mexican system of government. Meanwhile, the U.S. invasion stimulated feelings of nationalism and honor among much of the Mexican populace, meaning that continued resistance was popular.32 Thus, Mexican ofﬁcials favored continued ﬁghting for
a variety reasons, ranging from beliefs that victory was still possible to domestic political implications.
Thus, it is not enough to ﬁnd that one or a few important members of a government favored continued ﬁghting for a given reason. Rather, given that different individuals will have favored continued ﬁghting for different reasons, it is necessary to
consider how many members of the government thought in which terms, how inﬂuential they were in the decision to continue ﬁghting, and if their arguments about
why to continue ﬁghting swayed other members of the government.
The other reason that case studies can ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for competing
theories within the same case is that individual leaders may have multiple motives
for favoring continuing a war. People are rarely driven by single motives when it
comes to their beliefs about political strategies. It is perfectly consistent for an individual to be concerned simultaneously about any combination of commitment
problems, honor, personal gains, and the ability to hold a domestic coalition together. It is unlikely that individuals will openly and explicitly rank or weight the
various factors that motivate them to continue the war. Furthermore, individuals
may not be fully aware of how they would weigh the importance of their own motives. They may engage in rationalizations to avoid acknowledging their real motivations for their actions. They may also half-believe things or make unconscious
tradeoffs between various goods while refusing to acknowledge to themselves that
they are doing so.33 This means that leaders’ own statements of their motives may
not be entirely reliable.
For example, in May 1940, during World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill advanced a variety of reasons for continuing to ﬁght Germany even

32. John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The US War with Mexico 1846–1848 (New
York: Random House, 1989), 171, 269–74, and 358–68.
33. Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” at 644–45 (see note 11 above); Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” International Organization 64 (2010): 1–31.
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though France was clearly about to be knocked out of the war. First, Churchill argued that Britain could hold out militarily, provided the United States eventually
entered the war. Second, he believed that any likely German peace conditions would
be intolerable—both in their immediate implications and because they would leave
Britain at Germany’s mercy in coming years. Third, Churchill appealed to national
honor and prestige, arguing that it was better to go down ﬁghting than to surrender,
and that recent defeats in France and Norway had so lowered British prestige that
only further dogged resistance could ever raise it again. Finally, he argued that seeking Italian mediation would be futile and that any diplomatic opening would undermine British morale and convince Hitler of Britain’s weakness.34
Churchill never explicitly indicated which of these arguments he thought was
most important, nor is it especially clear which ones were most important in swaying other members of the cabinet. Indeed, some of his arguments, such as the notion
that Britain could get better terms from Germany at a later date, may have been deployed purely in the hope of swaying his fellow cabinet members, rather than being
something Churchill actually believed, since he had little or no inclination to ever
ask Germany for terms.
Obviously, this problem of leaders being unclear about their actual motives is
not limited to war duration research. What makes it particularly worrisome in such
research is that, when combined with the challenges discussed above—different individuals motived by different causes and multiple theories predicting like outcomes—researchers may be tempted to focus on evidence that conﬁrms their preferred explanation even though equally compelling evidence for other explanations
may exist.
Taken as a whole, these three difﬁculties—leaders being unclear about their motives, different individuals having different motives, and multiple theories of war duration predicting like outcomes—create a considerable challenge for determining
the causes of long wars. Since it is likely that different individuals will have different
motives and that even individuals may have multiple motives, at least some conﬁrming evidence for any reasonable explanation probably will exist. Furthermore,
since multiple explanations predict the same behaviors, even if scholars can agree
upon which behaviors are important, they may still be unable to agree on which motive was at work. To be clear, these are serious challenges to research on the duration
of long wars, but they are not insuperable obstacles. Good research, both in the form

34. John Lukacs, Five Days in London, May 1940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1999), 106–29, 147–49, and 182–83.
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of case studies and statistical analyses, can be and has been done on long wars. Importantly, researchers can adopt several strategies to overcome these challenges.
First, rather than simply suggesting that a cause is possible or that it played some
role in extending a war for many years, researchers need to keep these challenges in
mind and look for evidence that helps to sort out competing explanations. This requires explicitly discussing alternative explanations and how the evidence ﬁts or
does not ﬁt with the various competing explanations. Evidence that rules out potential causes will often be more important than evidence that rules in potential
causes. For example, using large-N methods, Weisiger sorts through three competing explanations about how the revelation of private information relates to war termination: that new and surprising information should lead to war termination;
that power shifts due to battles should not bring about war termination; and that
all relevant information should be related to termination. 35 The key is that the ﬁrst
explanation predicts that recent information and battleﬁeld shifts will lead to war
termination,36 the second that only the sum of all relevant information will lead to
war termination,37 and the last that both battleﬁeld shifts and the sum of all information will lead to war termination. Thus, by seeing which of these facts are correlated with termination and which are not correlated with termination, Weisiger is
able to conclude that the combination of recent battleﬁeld shifts and the sum of all
relevant information explanation best ﬁts the available evidence across a wide
range of wars.38 Similar approaches can be adopted for other potential factors using
both case studies and statistical methods.
Second, researchers also need to be open to the likelihood of multicausality and
to think in terms of the relative importance of causes, rather than to look for monocausal explanations. While this sounds straightforward enough, it can run against
the grain for those who are used to thinking in terms of big debates or competing
paradigms. Rather than asking, “Which explanation is correct?” it may be better to
ask, “When does each factor apply?” and “How much weight is each factor carrying in explaining a particular outcome?” Both rationalist and domestic politics approaches have taken an important step in this direction in discussing causes of war

35. Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battleﬁeld: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration,” International Organization 70 (2016): 347–75, at 365–71.
36. Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Termination,” 250–52 (see note 14 above).
37. Donald Wittman, “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conﬂict
Resolution 23 (1979): 743–63.
38. Of course, the other explanations could conceivably work better in a small subset of
wars, even if the overall trend is consistent with the notion that it is the sum of all available
information that best explains war termination.
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termination in terms of “equiﬁnality.”39 Multi-causality also has implications for
statistical analysis, since it can violate the assumption of unit homogeneity. As
Braumoeller puts it, multi-causality “implies a particular form of nonadditivity . . .
the presence or absence of one independent variable mitigates—or in the extreme,
nulliﬁes—the impact of another.”40 This greatly reduces a study’s ability to draw
causal inferences and must be dealt with through interaction terms, case selection,
and model speciﬁcation.41
Therefore, the key to conducting high-quality research on long wars is to acknowledge the inherent challenges posed by the topic and to design studies accordingly. If this is done, it should be possible to rule out some proposed causes and to
rule others in. It might also allow for determining the relative weights of various
factors in relation to the causes of long wars both overall and for speciﬁc wars. Without such careful research design, the ﬁeld likely will continue to generate interesting and plausible explanations, but will fail to make much headway in determining
which explanations are most important in general and for given wars in particular.
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39. Stanley and Sawyer, “The Equiﬁnality of War Termination,” (see note 27 above); Weisiger,
Logics of War, 2–3 (see note 1 above).
40. Bear Braumoeller, “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics,” Political Analysis 11
(2003): 209–33 at 211.
41. Braumoeller, in “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics,” 211–15, recommends
the use of Boolean probit and logit models as they can model various combinations of complexity (see previous note).
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